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FUNDAMENTALS OF ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES AND
WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT
PETER W. SCHUHMANN AND KURT A. SCHWABE
Abstract: This paper presents an overview of the economic fundamentals involved in wildlife management, with special
consideration for cases involving harmful wildlife-human interactions. The process of benefit-cost analysis is used as a unifying
platform for incorporating both theoretical and empirical issues. Topics such as external market effects and public goods are
detailed in order to give the reader a theoretical foundation for understanding the economic perspective on the problems associated with defining and attaining optimally managed wildlife populations. To these principles we add practical considerations for
measuring the costs and benefits associated with wildlife populations. Different categories of wildlife values, such as use and
nonuse values, and alternative methodologies for their measurement are described. The paper concludes with a discussion of
areas for improving data collection and value estimation so that the goals and perspectives of economists and wildlife managers
can be further integrated.
Key words: benefit cost analysis, economic value, wildlife management.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss, in general
terms, an economic approach to addressing the problems associated with human-wildlife conflicts. We say
general in that many of the remaining articles explore
the specifics of the problems and factors that we introduce. It should be noted that, from an economic perspective, human-wildlife conflicts are just 1 part of a
larger problem, wildlife management. Thus, we will
broaden our focus to include the optimal management
of wildlife, of which human-wildlife conflicts are an
integral part. Indeed, a somewhat naïve and trivial solution to minimizing the conflicts surrounding humanwildlife interaction would be to reduce the amount of
wildlife. Yet, in addition to the valuable roles wildlife
plays in protecting and enhancing ecosystems, people
value wildlife for both consumptive and nonconsumptive uses. While some of these values are captured in
markets, others are not.
An example of consumptive and nonconsumptive
values from wildlife is found in Loomis et al. (1989a).
They estimate the value of California deer for hunting
purposes to be approximately US$230 million and for
viewing purposes roughly US$34.5 million. Moreover,
the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service suggests that more
than 76 million Americans engage in “nonconsumptive
practices” such as viewing or photographing wildlife
(Ohio Division of Wildlife (ODNR 1998)). Hence, any
discussion of resolving the problems associated with
human-wildlife conflict must include the potential
trade-offs associated with the proposed solutions that
are likely to impact the value these resources generate.
Furthermore, such a discussion must acknowledge that
the interaction between human and market systems
and the natural environment flows in both directions
(Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Interaction between markets and the natural
environment. Adapted from Kahn (1998) and Baumol
and Blinder (1997).

One method that helps inform us of the relative
trade-offs of alternative wildlife management strategies
is Benefit-Cost Analysis. Benefit-Costs Analysis (BCA)
provides for a systematic enumeration of the gains
(benefits) and losses (costs) of particular decisions, in
common units, for comparison purposes. Reed et al.
(1982) provide 1 of the few BCAs of human-wildlife
conflict in their research on reducing deer-vehicle collisions (DVCs). In their analysis, the benefits of reducing
DVCs are associated with lower deer mortality and vehicle damage, while the costs of reducing these events
include fence installation and maintenance. Conceptually, Reed et al. account for 2 of the 3 economic aspects
that Keith and Lyon (1985) outline as necessary requirements of public wildlife management decisions, including: (1) “…value to users of increases or decreases in
wildlife populations,” and (2) “the costs of providing
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increments of wildlife populations through habitat
manipulations and/or other management alternatives.”
Keith and Lyon also suggest such analyses account for
the relationships between current and future wildlife
populations.
The importance of accounting for both the temporal and spatial dimensions associated with wildlife
populations and management decisions are critical. As
Tietenberg (1997) notes, wildlife populations, like other
resource stocks, are viewed by economists as composite
assets that provide benefits to humans over time, and as
with other assets, we wish to optimize their value. From
an economic perspective, then, the primary goal of
wildlife management is to find the population size that
maximizes the net benefits from the resource, where
net benefits are defined as the difference between total
costs and total benefits to all affected parties of using
the resource.1 Once the optimal population size has
been determined, a secondary goal is to evaluate alternative measures for achieving this size. Together, these
actions synthesize 2 general strands of research in the
economics of wildlife management: works that focus
on estimating the value of additional wildlife resources
(e.g., Hammack and Brown 1974, Keith and Lyon 1985,
Loomis et al. 1989a, Bockstael and McConnell 1999)
and works that estimate costs that wildlife impose on
society (e.g., Reed et al. 1982, Conover 1994, Romin and
Bissonette 1996a).
The next section will highlight the economic consequences associated with human-wildlife conflict by
presenting some general cost and damages estimates.
This section will also include a discussion of some
of the difficulties associated with managing wildlife
resources, including problems associated with externalities, open-access, and public goods. The third section
will discuss the conceptual aspects of using net benefits
as the criterion to judge the economic desirability of
alternative management schemes. How we define benefits, what counts as a cost, and the importance of
including the time element are all addressed. The fourth
section presents some empirical issues and estimates
for valuing and costing wildlife resources. In particular,
several environmental resource valuation techniques
designed to capture the nonmarket value of wildlife
resources are discussed. The last section concludes
with a discussion of potential policies for achieving
the desired objectives and calls for coordinated efforts
between researchers within different disciplines and
both local and state wildlife agencies.
Before discussing the costs and damages associated with human-wildlife conflicts, it is important to
acknowledge a few assumptions we, as economists,
make. First, “value” is defined in an anthropocentric
1

We note that the parties that realize the benefits from a given wildlife population or wildlife policy may be different than those individuals that bear its
costs. Further, both benefits and costs may be distributed temporally and
spatially.
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context. That is, a resource has value only to the extent
that people care about it. This is in contrast to defining
value in a biocentric context, which basically gives
all creatures in the ecosystem equal standing (Loomis
1993). Second, the value of a resource, even in economics terms, can include both market and nonmarket activities, as well as both use and nonuse values.2 Finally,
while the term “human-wildlife conflict” includes both
the impact of wildlife on humans and the impact of
humans on wildlife, our primary focus is on the impact
of wildlife on humans. It should be noted, though, that
this approach does not exclude the value that people
place on damages to wildlife. Indeed, such aesthetic or
moral values do fit within the anthropocentric realm.
COSTS, DAMAGES, AND MARKET FAILURE IN
THE MANAGEMENT OF WILDLIFE
Only a cursory familiarization with the literature
on human-wildlife interaction is needed to appreciate
what these interactions cost society (e.g., Conover 1994,
Conover et al. 1995, Cook and Daggett 1995, Romin
and Bissonette 1996). One of the most complete evaluations of the costs wildlife impose on the United States
was by Conover et al. (1995). In their summary of wildlife-human conflicts nationwide (including human illness and fatalities from wildlife-related diseases, bites or
attacks; animal-vehicle collisions; and wildlife damage
to agricultural production, households, and timber production) the authors estimated that roughly 415 deaths
and 75,000 injuries or illnesses occurred each year from
wildlife-related disease, attacks, and collisions. Overall,
Conover et al. suggested that the total economic loss
from wildlife-related damages was approximately US$3
billion annually.3 To put this figure in perspective, the
annual budget of the federal government for conservation and land management programs is less than US$5
billion (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1996).
One of the largest components of these damages
is deer-vehicle collisions. The National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration suggested that 120 human deaths
occurred from DVCs in 1990 and estimated that the
national cost in motorist loss of life and injury is
nearly US$200 million annually. In terms of lost wildlife,
Romin and Bissonette (1996) estimated that more than
500,000 deer are killed each year in DVCs. Cook and
Daggett (1995) estimated that vehicle collisions account
for 500 moose deaths in Alaska every year, and over a
5-year period more than 200 black bear deaths occurred
from animal-vehicle collisions in Florida and Pennsylva2

“Use” values include those values associated with the tangible uses of the
resources while “nonuse” values account for the intangible uses, such as leaving the resource for future generations. Further discussion of these concepts
is provided in a later section.
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From a regulatory perspective, the United States Department of Agriculture
Wildlife Services Program spent more than US$26 million in 1988 on efforts
to reduce the damages from wildlife and spent an additional US$11 million
on administration-related expenditures (Rollins and Briggs 1996).
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nia. Endangered species are also lost in animal-vehicle
collisions. For example, since 1979 more than 54% of
the endangered Florida panther population and 65 of
the 300 endangered Florida Key deer have been killed
via collisions with vehicles (Cook and Daggett 1995).
Finally, more than 20 million small animals (e.g., rabbits,
badgers, reptiles, dogs, cat, and birds) are killed each
year due to collisions with vehicles, including aircraft
(Cook and Daggett 1995).
In addition to the costs associated with collisions
with vehicles, wildlife-related crop damages are a substantial component of the overall costs of human-wildlife conflict. Estimates of annual wildlife-related crop
damage in the U.S. range from US$464 million in 1994
(Conover et. al. 1995) to US$533 million in 1989 (Wywialowski 1994). At the state-level, Forster and Hitzhusen
(1997) estimated that Ohio farmers lost approximately
US$46 million from wildlife-related crop damage.
While these costs and damages may seem excessive and beg for immediate management intervention,
optimal management strategies must consider both the
costs and benefits of wildlife resources. Indeed, many
states explicitly express their objectives of managing
wildlife populations with consideration of both the
benefits and costs. For example, in Ohio the goal
for deer management includes maximizing the recreational opportunities such as hunting, viewing, and
photographing within the context of minimizing conflicts with agriculture, motor travel, and other areas
of human endeavor (Ohio Department of Natural
Resources 1998). Similarly, in Wisconsin the deer management policy states that, “…regulations shall be
designed to maintain a herd in balance with its range
and at population levels reasonably compatible with
agricultural and forest management objectives…”(Creed
et al. 1984). These principles capture the idea of optimal management strategy, yet in practice 3 potential
problems arise that can inhibit local or state officials
from managing these resources optimally. These include
externalities, open access externalities, and public
goods.
Externalities and Open-Access
Many states manage wildlife resources in terms
of geographical areas. For instance, in Wisconsin deer
resources are managed in “management units,” with
96 such units in the state and each unit averaging
approximately 1,500 km2. Similarly, Ohio manages its
wildlife populations at the county level. One problem
with this management scheme is that wildlife resources
are not physically confined to either management units
or county boundaries. As such, actions officials take at
the management unit level are likely to impose costs
(or benefits) on the adjacent areas. In essence, the management authorities in 1 unit will base their optimal
population targets on the benefits and costs that they

incur but will not account for or “internalize” any residual effects these actions impose on surrounding areas.
These residual effects often translate into costs and benefits imposed on others. When decisions by 1 county
or management unit are made without consideration
of the external costs or benefits these decisions may
impose on others, each county or management unit may
achieve their economically efficient population levels,
but the state as a whole may be operating at an inefficient level. This suggests that some intervention at the
state level should coordinate population targets across
inter-county or management units. Clearly, the distributional effects of policy on overall efficiency should play
a role in policy design.
Another problem with managing wildlife
resources is that many of these resources reside on
private lands. As such, decisions by the private landowner with respect to maintaining suitable habitats for
these resources may not be optimal for society. In other
words, the private landowner’s actions impose costs
on society.4 For example, Rollins and Briggs (1996) discussed private decision-making by agricultural landowners near Horicon Marsh in Wisconsin regarding whether
to passively provide forage for Canada geese (Branta
Canadensis) as the geese migrate across their land.
These geese provide large recreational benefits to hunters (Bishop and Heberlein 1979), yet the costs accrue to
agricultural producers via foregone production. Hence,
private decisions by landowners around Horicon Marsh
may not acknowledge the benefits these geese provide
to Wisconsin hunters. From society’s perspective, the
benefits of having the geese available for hunting may
outweigh the costs the geese impose on agriculture.
Hence, when the incidences of costs and benefits from
a particular resource management decision differ, the
solution attained through private decision-making is
likely to be inefficient. We can conclude that the problems associated with both fugitive resources and externalities complicate the management process, and suggest that efforts to achieve the socially optimal population size require a higher level of government involvement.
As the term implies, a resource that is considered
open-access, meaning it is open to uncontrolled access
by potential users of the resource (Field 1997), often
leads to users imposing external costs on other users
and nonusers of the resource. A classic example
includes a fishery where the anglers continue to fish
without considering the impacts of their actions on
others, i.e., less fish for other anglers. In effect, individuals engage in their own private-decision making process
without regard to the external costs they impose on
others. With an open-access resource, the costs are in
4

Alternatively, decisions by the federal, state, or local governments with
respect to resource usage could impose costs on private landowners. For a
detailed discussion how of public agencies impose costs on private landowners with respect to wildlife management, see Lueck (1995).
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the form of a reduction in resources, resource usage, or
resource quality for others. Finally, since the resource
is open-access, 1 user cannot restrict another user
from the resource. From an economic perspective, the
market alone will not utilize the resource efficiently and
thus some level of government intervention is required.
Public Goods
Another difficulty with managing resources at the
local level is that many of these resources have public
good characteristics. A public good is a good that is
both nonrivial and nonexcludable. That is, 1 person’s
consumption does not diminish the amount left over
for others to consumer (nonrivial) nor does 1 person’s
consumption inhibit others from consuming the good
(nonexcludable). Thus, once a public good such as wildlife services are provided to 1 unit or locality, another
unit can consume them without cost.
While at first glance public goods may not seem
like a problem, consider the case of endangered species
that reside in such a unit or county. The benefits the
species provide to society may extend far beyond the
borders of the unit or county. Indeed, such benefits can
conceivably extend over political and national boundaries and across generations. Yet, the costs of maintaining
these resources are likely to fall upon the authority
under which the resource resides. While it is likely that
the value to society is much greater than the costs of
maintaining the resource, appropriating the required
funds for maintaining the resource from members of
society that value it may be difficult. This difficulty
arises because once the resource is provided to 1, everyone can “use” it regardless of his or her part in helping
to provide the resource. This phenomenon, known as
“free-riding”, takes place because of the assumption
that other members will provide the resource. If
enough members engage in this “free-riding,” the funds
required to provide the resource may be inadequate and
thus the resource may be under-provided. While this
problem does provide a role for additional government
involvement, such as public financing for the good, government action may not resolve the problem fully. As
Loomis (1993) pointed out, the provision of additional
public goods still involves opportunity costs, costs that
may consist of tax monies that would otherwise provide
alternative services that people value. As such, these
are additional trade-offs whose costs and benefits need
to be evaluated to determine the overall impact on net
benefits.
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH NET
BENEFITS: BENEFITS, COSTS, AND TIME
The attractiveness of BCA is that it can inform
policy makers of the benefits and costs of alternative
resource uses to society and provide a criterion – net
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benefits – by which to judge alternatives. We begin this
section with a definition of benefits and costs, and then
discuss some issues involved with combining these 2
factors into an estimate of net benefits. We conclude
with a discussion of the dynamic nature of wildlife
resources and the importance of acknowledging the
distribution of costs and benefits across time.
Benefits
Economists use the term “benefits” to mean the
dollar value of the satisfaction obtained from the use of
a good or service. It is important to identify 2 characteristics of the term “value” in economics. As noted in Field
(1997) and mentioned above, value is defined from an
anthropocentric context and is only meaningful relative
to what people are willing and able to give up for the
good or service. If people are not willing to pay or trade
something to obtain a particular good, we say that good
has zero value. Alternatively, if someone was willing and
able to give up some amount of 1 good for another
good, say a pair of tennis shoes for a hunting license, we
would say that this person values the hunting license at
least as much as a pair of tennis shoes.
While there may be many combinations of goods
people would be willing and able to give up for any
other particular good, what is useful and convenient
for comparison and aggregation purposes is to define
the value of a particular good to an individual as the
most this individual would be willing and able to give
up to obtain the good (Fig. 2). Furthermore, and again
for comparison and aggregation purposes, it would be
convenient to measure the trade-offs with a common
metric. Economists have therefore defined the value of
a good to any particular individual as the most this
individual would be willing and able to pay for the
good (Fig. 2). Going back to benefits, then, we see that
the benefits one derives from a good or service can
be measured by the (greatest) amount of income an
individual would be willing (and able) to give up in
order to consume the good. While income is used as a
measure of the amount by which an individual is made

Fig. 2. The components of value.
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better off from using the resource, it should be noted
that there is nothing inherently attractive about income.
Rather, income serves as a proxy for the other bundles
of goods or services this income could have otherwise
purchased.
These concepts may seem relatively straightforward, yet there are some common misunderstandings
and misconceptions with how economists use the term
value, and ultimately then, benefits. First, value is not
measured by what you actually have to pay for a good,
but rather by what you would be willing to pay for a
good. Along these same lines, cost is not an accurate
representation of value. One can easily imagine a service that costs an enormous amount, say importing sand
from the Middle East to Colorado, yet is valued quite
low.
As far as misconceptions, economic value is often
thought of as only pertaining to those goods that are
traded in the market place, i.e., market goods have value
as observed by people willing to buy and sell them.
Yet, goods that are not traded in the market (nonmarket
goods such as clean air, clean water, or the sunset at
the Grand Canyon) have economic value as well. In
these latter cases, rather than obtaining these goods via
trades in the market place, people are willing to give
up time or other resources (including money) for the
opportunity to consume them.
Finally, the economic value of a nonmarket good
entails both use and nonuse values. The more commonly acknowledged “use” value consists of the tangible components of the good, such as actually traveling
to the Grand Canyon to see the sunsets, view the
wildlife, or hike the trails. The less commonly known
“nonuse” values pertain to the intangible or indirect
uses of a good. Such intangible uses, which will be
discussed in more detail in the next section, include
saving the good for use at some other time (option
value), saving the good for future generations (bequest
value), saving the good for others to use now (altruistic
value), and simply saving the good for the mere sake of
its existence (existence value).
One of the guiding principles of economics is
that the additional benefits or satisfaction derived from
subsequent units of a given resource typically decrease,
i.e., benefits are decreasing at the margin. For example,
the benefit realized by a hunter for the first unit of
game harvested will likely exceed the benefits from
the second unit harvested, and so on.5 As the marginal
benefit is the dollar value of the satisfaction derived
from an additional unit of the resource, we can state
that marginal benefit is a measure of the maximum
willingness to pay for that unit. Hence we can assume
that a hunter’s willingness to pay for additional units of
5

It is important to recognize that this assumes that the quality of a unit is
held constant.

Fig. 3. Marginal costs and marginal benefits.

the resource will be decreasing in the quantity of the
resource consumed. This relationship is illustrated in
Fig. 1 by the marginal benefit curve (MB).6
The marginal benefit curve (MB) is synonymous
with the demand curve used in economic principles,
and provides several pieces of information regarding
the preferences of individuals for a particular good or
service.7 Starting with a particular quantity on the horizontal axis, the MB curve reveals the marginal benefit
or willingness-to-pay for that unit (Fig. 3). This value
is the highest price the individual would pay for that
additional unit. Starting with a dollar value on the vertical axis, the MB curve also reveals the greatest quantity
that will be purchased at that dollar value or price. The
area under the MB curve at any quantity is the total willingness to pay for that consumption level. This value,
which is also referred to as the benefits, represents the
amount a person would be willing to pay to attain that
level of the good or service rather than go without it
entirely (Field 1997).

Costs
The cost of achieving a particular objective can
be thought of as what is given up – i.e., inputs – to
obtain the objective. Typically, we use the term opportunity costs – a term that measures the dollar value
of the inputs in their next best alternative. As noted in
Boardman et al. (1996), opportunity costs measure the
value of what society must forego to achieve any particular objective. The reason we use the term opportu6

While we present the MB function as a straight line that need not be the case.
It is often represented by a negatively sloped curve.

7

The MB curve for an individual reveals his or her preferences for the good
or service and is a function of his or her willingness and ability to pay for
that good. The summation of a number of individual demand curves (known
as an aggregate demand curve) reveals the marginal benefit for a group of
individuals.
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nity costs is that by using the resources for 1 activity, we
give up the opportunity of using these same resources
in another activity. For example, in erecting fences
along a highway to reduce the incidences of DVCs, the
costs would include the capital and labor required to
install and maintain the fencing. There may also be
some administrative costs required to coordinate the
installation and maintenance.
While benefits are modeled as decreasing at the
margin, economists typically model costs as increasing
at the margin. This relationship holds for both costs
of production and costs in terms of foregone benefits
from natural resources. 8 Increasing costs of production
follows from the law of diminishing marginal productivity (e.g., Hyman 1996:199-203) which states that given
some fixed factors of production the additional opportunity costs of production increase as more of that
particular product is produced. The increasing foregone
benefits suggest that, as more of a resource is used
up today, the value of remaining units of the resource
will increase. For example, as more and more deer are
depleted via hunting thus leaving fewer for the remaining part of the season, the value of those remaining deer
will likely increase (Fig. 1).
In the context of market goods and services, the
marginal cost curve (MC) represents the supply relationship for the good. In this sense, this curve reveals the
quantity of the good that firms would be willing and
able to bring to market at various prices. This interpretation is not as appropriate for environmental goods
and services. However, we can represent the cost of
providing different levels of environmental goods with
an upward sloping function. Again, the marginal cost of
a particular quantity unit is found using the corresponding value on the vertical axis, and the area under the
MC curve at that quantity represents the total cost of
providing that quantity, barring any fixed costs.
Net Benefits
The net benefits of a particular good or service
are simply the difference between the value society
places on that good or service, i.e., the most they would
be willing to pay, less the resources they must forego
to obtain it, i.e., the opportunity costs. For example,
suppose a hunter values the opportunity to hunt deer
during a particular season at US$100. That is, the most
they would be willing to pay, i.e., the benefits, for hunting deer is US$100. Furthermore, let us suppose that in
order to hunt deer, the hunter must purchase both a
hunting license for US$20 and a deer permit for US$15,
for a total cost of US$35. The net benefits of hunting
deer to this particular hunter, then, is US$65.
8

This principle follows from the scarcity of resources – the fewer units of a
good that are available, the higher the marginal value of each unit. This cost
is often referred to as the “user cost.”
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Now the question arises as to what is lost if
this hunter is not allowed to hunt deer. Obviously, the
hunter will not garner the benefits of hunting the deer,
which is measured at US$100. Yet, this is not what
is lost, since the hunter would have had to forgo the
US$35 to hunt the deer. That is, if he cannot hunt
deer, he still has the US$35 to spend in some other
manner. What are lost, then, are the net benefits that
the hunter would have derived from engaging in the
hunting experience, i.e., US$65. The loss to society of
not allowing this hunter to hunt deer is the additional
benefit above and beyond the costs required to hunt
deer. This term, labeled above as net benefits, is commonly referred to as “consumer surplus,” and is used
to gauge the gain or loss to society from a particular
action.
Focusing on Fig. 3 the net benefits (benefits less
costs) of a given quantity is the area below the MB
curve and above the MC curve. Economic efficiency
in provision of the good or service is defined as the
quantity of the environmental service that maximizes
the total net benefits realized by society. Achieving
this optimal quantity requires that both the marginal
benefit and marginal cost relationships be measured
and examined together. Economic efficiency is achieved
by balancing the costs of an additional unit with the
benefits of an additional unit. Because of the shapes of
these 2 functions, by producing and consuming up to
the point where the marginal benefit of another unit is
equal to the marginal cost (MB = MC), an efficient solution is achieved and net benefits are maximized.
Q* shows the quantity that maximizes net benefits. At Q* the MB and MC curves intersect – i.e., MB
= MC. To understand why net benefits are maximized
at this point, consider producing either 1 more or 1 less
unit. If society produces 1 more unit (Q* +1), the marginal cost of that additional unit is greater than the marginal benefit of that additional unit. Therefore, production and consumption of that unit causes net benefits
to decrease. Alternatively, if production decreases by 1
unit (Q* -1), the forgone benefits are greater than the
costs saved. Again, this would lead to a reduction in
the overall net benefits. Hence, movements away from
Q*, whether to the left or the right, necessarily lead to
fewer net benefits and are therefore deemed suboptimal
or inefficient.
Net Benefits, Populations, and Time
While it may seem straightforward to calculate
the benefits, the costs, and then the net benefits of a
particular action, 2 factors arise in managing wildlife
resources that can add further complexity to the issue.
First, since wildlife populations are essentially renewable resources, actions to control populations today will
have implications on the future availability of the population. Second, it is often the case that benefits and
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costs of wildlife management activities are incurred in
different time periods (or by different individuals in the
same time period).
A consideration of the full costs and benefits of
a wildlife population requires that the dynamic nature
of the resource be recognized, modeled, and directly
linked to economic valuation. Empirical examples of
so-called “bioeconomic models” are fairly uncommon
in the literature because they require a synthesis of
knowledge and methods from multiple disciplines.9 To
illustrate the importance of these different views on
resource management, we present a well-known treatment of the problem of renewable resource management.
Assuming that a resource stock or population in
question is characterized by a logistic growth pattern,
growth of the population will be increasing in population up to some size, after which population growth
is positive but decreasing until the stock reaches some
maximum possible size (the carrying capacity of the
environment). A given level of harvest (measured in the
same units as growth) is said to be a “sustainable yield”
when it is equal to the growth rate of the population.
That is, when the rate of removal is equal to the rate
of natural growth, a situation develops where the rate
of removal is sustainable indefinitely, at least from a
theoretical perspective. The population size that allows
for the highest rate of growth is termed the maximum
sustainable yield (MSY).
Managing a population at the maximum sustainable yield, though, may not be efficient from an economic perspective. Merely examining yield (the number
of units of the resource that are harvested per time
period) only reveals the benefits derived from a given
population size. For efficiency, both costs and benefits
must be considered to achieve an efficient sustainable
yield (ESY). The ESY is defined by the harvest rate
that, when maintained perpetually, produces the largest
amount of net benefits. The 2 types of costs that are
generally considered in such dynamic models include
the costs of harvest efforts and the costs imposed on
individuals outside the market (i.e., the “external costs”
such as DVCs and crop damage). Because the costs of
harvest efforts are likely decreasing in the size of the
resource population while the external costs are likely
increasing in population size, the shape of the cost function for a given resource is an empirical question. We
can state, however, that the efficient sustainable yield
is unlikely to occur at the same population size as the
maximum sustainable yield.
Another potential complication associated with
estimating the net benefits of a particular action is that
9

One of the first empirical applications linking wildlife stocks and consumer
surplus in a dynamic setting was Brown and Hammack’s (1974) study on
managing waterfowl. Other studies that use a dynamic approach include
Keith and Lyon (1985), Cooper (1993), and Schuhmann and Easley (2000).

some costs and benefits may be realized immediately
while others may be realized in the future.10 Indeed,
most wildlife policy changes are likely to lead to costs
and benefits that may be distributed over a lengthy
time horizon. Furthermore, they may be distributed
unevenly. For example, the costs of a given resource
enhancement project may be borne by the present generation, but because natural stocks take time to regenerate, the benefits may not be realized until well into
the future. Since a given dollar value realized in the
future is worth less than a dollar in the present, future
costs and benefits must be converted into present value
terms in order to make a meaningful comparison.11 The
mathematical process of calculating the present value of
future costs and benefits is called discounting, and relies
on an assumption about the opportunity cost of funds,
known as the discount rate.12 Specifically, using a higher
discount rate decreases the present value of future dollars relative to current dollars. A “zero” discount rate
suggests that a dollar in the future is worth a dollar
today. Given that the choice of discount rate can significantly influence the discounted present value of the
costs and benefits of a policy change, it is a controversial topic (Mikesell 1977, Kahn 1998:111-113). While it
seems there is no 1 right discount rate, there are certain
situations that suggest the use of a rate similar to the
risk-free market rate of interest, such as that earned
on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, and other situations
where it makes intuitive sense to use a discount rate
lower than the risk-free market rate.
Finally, it is important to acknowledge the potential uncertainty surrounding the outcomes of particular
policies and thus the difficulties of choosing 1 policy
over another using BCA. Because there is likely some
uncertainty in the parameter estimation of in any causeand-effect relationships involving wildlife, it is useful
if not necessary to perform some type of sensitivity
analysis. For example, consider a policy designed to
reduce the growth of urban deer populations through
the implementation of controlled public hunts or birth
control. In either case, natural parameters such as deer
population size, fecundity and mortality rates will be
unknown but will have an important bearing on the
efficacy of the policy change in accomplishing its objectives. It is therefore critical that the assumed parameters
in the study are varied over a reasonable range of values
to examine how sensitive the study’s results are to
changes in the assumptions. At a minimum, upper and
10

Distribution of costs and benefits across different types of individuals presents a similar, and perhaps more complicated issue, as monetary costs
incurred by 1 party must in some way be compared to monetary benefits
accruing to another. Such equity considerations of wildlife policy changes,
while typically not the focus of economic analysis, indeed warrant attention,
as these matters are likely to be controversial.
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For example, for a 5% discount rate, US$100 today is valued at US$105 in
1 year.

12

The present value, PV, of a dollar value, v, realized t years in the future is
calculated as: PV = v , where r is the discount rate.
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lower bounds on the results should be presented (Kahn
1998).
Empirical Estimation of the Benefits and Costs
For most goods and services, a starting point for
estimating costs and benefits is the market price that
facilitates a transaction. The price paid by consumers is
at least a lower bound on the benefits derived by the
consumer and an upper bound on the costs of production borne by the producer.13 Yet when it comes to
environmental and natural resources such as wildlife,
the market price captures only the market value of the
resource. For many wildlife resources, the nonmarket
value may likely comprise a larger share, if not all, of
the total value of a resource to society than the market
value. This, of course, presents a challenging problem in
measuring the value of the resources in our BCA objectives or even in “pricing” the resources appropriately so
that they are not overused and exploited inefficiently.
Indeed, since price is a rationing device that allocates
resources to their highest valued use, those resources
that are not priced or under-priced are likely to be inefficiently allocated, consumed, and/or produced.
The remaining part of this section will discuss
a number of techniques environmental and natural
resource economists use to quantify the value society
places on these resources. The 2 general categories
include revealed preference methods and stated preference methods. Before we discuss these methods of
valuing environmental resources, we briefly discuss the
2 types of values that comprise the full value of a
resource, use and nonuse values (Fig. 2). The section
concludes with a discussion of empirical cost estimation.
Use and Nonuse Values
When considering the benefits derived from wildlife and other environmental goods and services, it is
important to recognize that the value of a particular
resource at any point in time can consist of both a
use value and a nonuse value. Use value, as suggested
in Boyle and Bishop (1987), can be divided into both
consumptive use and nonconsumptive use, the common
denominator being direct contact with the resource.
Consumptive use would entail such uses as bagging a
deer, catching a fish, or trapping a raccoon. Essentially,
consumptive use means extracting the resource from its
habitat (Boyle and Bishop 1987). Nonconsumptive use,
alternatively, relates to the uses of resources that do not
involve extraction. Bird watching and photographing
wildlife, for instance, are considered nonconsumptive
uses.

Nonuse values, alternatively, account for the
intangible uses of a resource and represent what be
referred to as the intrinsic value of the resource.
Nonuse values themselves capture differ concepts of
value. Initially, nonuse values were categorized as either
an option value, which was introduced by Weisbrod
(1964), or existence value, which was introduced by
Krutilla (1967). Option value is the value people place
on the future availability of a resource even though
there is uncertainty surrounding its future use. Existence value is the value an individual places on a
resource simply for its’ preservation. As Brookshire et
al. (1983) suggest, “Some individuals may derive satisfaction from knowing that a certain species and natural
environments exist and therefore may be willing to
pay for the preservation of such natural resources.” For
specificity’s sake, 2 additional categories were defined
since Weisbrod’s (1964) and Krutilla’s (1967) original
classification, including bequest value and altruistic
value. Bequest value captures the nonuse value for the
resource today so that future generations will have the
opportunity to use it, while altruistic value captures
the nonuse value for a resource today by an individual
so that others have an opportunity to use it today. It
should be emphasized that while most environmental
economists agree that resources can have both existence and option values, there is some disagreement
about whether our valuation methodologies can measure these values accurately (Brookshire et al. 1983,
Boyle and Bishop 1987, Brookshire and Smith 1987,
Madariaga and McConnell 1987).14
Revealed Preference Methods
Revealed preference methods examine decisions
that individuals make regarding market goods that are
used together with nonmarket goods to reveal the value
of the nonmarket good (Kahn 1998). These methods
require that a link be established between changes in
the environmental good or resource and changes in the
observed behavior of people. For instance, decreases
in water quality along a particular stretch of river may
result in fewer fish. Anglers, whose objectives are to
catch fish, may move to another part of the river or to a
different river altogether. Thus, a link can be established
between the environmental resource, in this case water
quality (or fish), and observed behavior – angler fishing
location. In establishing this link, it is important to
account for any other potential factors that may be causing behavior to change and, as mentioned in Bockstael
and McConnell (1999), requires that we observe “paired
observations” between different levels of the environmental good and the associated levels of observed
14

13

Price will only represent the actual market benefits and market costs for
the marginal consumer and producer. For the inframarginal consumers and
producers, prices underestimate benefits and overestimate costs.
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These values are also referred to as “passive use” values. That people readily
contribute to wildlife or other environmental organizations is often cited
as evidence that these values exist. However, the topic of nonuse values in
economics is not without controversy. Again, see the above references for a
more complete discussion.
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behavior. With this information, we can estimate a function, such as a demand or marginal willingness to pay
function, which will allow us to estimate the value of
particular changes in an environmental resource. The
4 most commonly used revealed preference methods
we will discuss are the travel cost method (TCM), the
random utility model approach, the hedonic travel cost
method (HM), and the household production function
(Bockstael et al. 1987, 1989).
The TCM, 1 of the most widely used valuation
techniques, uses information on the travel costs and
number of trips to a particular site to estimate the value
of that site or the value of resources that comprise the
site. As Mendelsohn and Brown note, the TCM uses the
fact that people travel different distances to a particular
site and therefore can be expected to participate at
different levels. Using the distance traveled as a proxy
for the price of a trip and the number of trips as the
quantity, individual or group demand curves can be
estimated for a site.15 The net benefits of a particular
site or the value of the resources within each site can
then be estimated. That is, with data on the number of
visits a group of hunters, anglers, or recreationists take
in a given period of time, a measure of the quality of
the resource realized on each trip,16 and the travel costs
incurred, we can estimate a demand or marginal benefit
function for trips. This function can then be used to
calculate the change in benefits from a change in the
resource quality measure.
There are a number of wildlife valuation studies
that use TCM. One of the first TCM studies valuing wildlife was by Miller and Hay (1981), who estimated the
degree to which hunting site characteristics and travel
distances affect hunter participation and calculated the
annual losses to duck hunters from a 10% loss of habitat
at waterfowl hunting sites. Sandry et al. (1983) used the
TCM to evaluate Rocky Mountain elk tag pricing strategies in Oregon. They found that increases in the current
price for elk hunting tags would increase revenues to
the Department of Fish and Wildlife and would more
closely equilibrate the demand for elk hunting permits
with the departments exogenously determined supply.
Brooks (1988), in using the TCM to estimate the net
economic value for deer hunting in Montana, found that
hunters would be willing to pay an additional US$108
more per trip, on average, than they currently pay.17
The Random Utility Model is a variation of the
travel cost method where the choice of recreation site is
viewed as a function of the satisfaction, or utility hereaf15

It should be emphasized the TCM is generally used to estimate the demand at
1 particular site and not a number of sites.

16

For example, the number of fish caught on a fishing trip or a measure of the
quality of game hunted.

17

Also targeting deer hunting, Balkan and Kahn (1988) estimated the value of
increasing deer populations in New York. Finally, Adamowicz et al. (1990)
developed a variant of the traditional TCM, essentially a sequential TCM, to
value sites that allow big horn sheep hunting in Alberta.

ter, derived from the alternative sites. A trip utility function is specified to be a function of site characteristics
and can be estimated using data on individual trips and
site characteristics. The estimated utility function can
then be used to approximate the consumer surplus
from a change in 1 of the site characteristics. For recreational hunting trips, a characteristic likely to influence
site choice is the expected success rate.18 This technique can therefore be employed to value hypothetical
changes in hunting success rates. While there are many
applications and studies using RUMs, including valuing
changes in water quality and characteristics associated
with fishing (e.g., Bockstael et al.1987, Morey et al. 1991,
Kaoru et al. 1995, and Schuhmann 1998), analyses of
other wildlife-related resources are sparse.19
The hedonic travel cost method is used to
measure the value of separate characteristics of a
resource (Brown and Mendelsohn 1983, Mendelsohn
1984, Palmquist 1991). In essence, by observing purchases of market goods – travel, in this case – which
must be made to gain access to the resource, one can
impute the implicit prices for characteristics of the
resource. This method relies on differences in the travel
costs and expenditures across agents in their gaining
access to the resource to value the associated environmental amenities. For example, using data collected
on the travel costs across individuals to various sites
they visit, as well as the physical and environmental
attributes of each particular site, we can estimate a
function describing how travel costs (i.e., price) are
related to those attributes. From here, the contribution
of the environmental good to the “price” of travel can
be approximated. Furthermore, the value of a change in
the environmental good can be estimated.
Traditionally, hedonic models have been used to
value characteristics of market goods but there are
numerous applications to natural resources. Brown and
Mendelsohn (1983) used a hedonic travel cost model to
estimate the value of congestion, scenery, and fish density to Washington steelhead anglers. Livengood (1983),
in his analysis of white-tailed deer hunting in Texas,
used a hedonic travel cost model to value the deer
harvested on leased land. Deer were again the focus of
Mendelsohn’s (1984) study that used the hedonic travel
cost method to value increases in deer density in Pennsylvania. Finally, Englin and Mendelsohn (1985) used the
hedonic travel cost method to estimate the impact of
forestry on recreation in the Cascade Mountains.
The household production function (HPF)
approach estimates wildlife values by linking changes
18

Note that the change in success need not be an improvement. The loss
in benefits from a decrease in hunting quality can also be estimated with
this method.

19

Schwabe et al. (2000) used a RUM to estimate the value of increasing
deer season length as a means of increasing hunter welfare and decreasing the impacts of deer populations on crop damage and deer-vehicle
collisions.
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in observable household outputs to changes in environmental resources. In effect, we assume that the household, in its efforts to maximize utility with a limited
budget of time and money, produces outputs such as
recreation time, expenditures on certain wildlife-related
goods, number of trips to engage in a specific type
of resource-related activity, harvested deer, and other
goods. The relationship we have to establish, then, is
between changes in the resource in question and 1 or
more of the outputs that go into the household production function. This method, unfortunately, is subject
to a number of difficulties in the estimation process
thus limiting its use in evaluating wildlife resources
(Pollack and Wachter 1975, Bockstael and McConnell
1981, Brown and Mendelsohn 1983). Empirical applications of this method include Keith and Lyon (1985) who
estimated the value to hunters of an increase in a Utah
deer herd.
Stated Preference Methods
Stated preference methods employ survey techniques to solicit value measures directly from individuals by asking hypothetical questions. That is, rather
than drawing inferences about value from observed
behavior, stated preference methods ask people about
the values they place on nonmarket goods such as wildlife resources. Obviously, the principal advantage of
revealed preference methods is that they use actual
market behavior as a starting point for the estimation
of resource values. However, this also means that
these methods are insufficient to capture the value of
resources that are not associated with direct use. Stated
preference techniques, which rely on the use of surveys, are the only methods able to capture the nonuse
values associated with a resource. Two of the more
popular stated preference techniques are the contingent
valuation method and conjoint analysis.
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is the
most commonly employed of the stated preference techniques for valuing environmental and natural resources.
It has been used to value wildlife resources for both
consumptive and nonconsumptive purposes, including
wildlife such as bald eagles and striped shiners (Boyle
and Bishop 1987), grizzly bears and bighorn sheep
(Brookshire et al. 1983), deer (Loomis et al. 1989a),
and waterfowl (Brown and Hammack 1973, Bishop and
Heberlein 1979). Survey respondents are presented with
detailed descriptions of resource quality and are asked
to either directly state their willingness to pay for hypothetical changes in that quality or to indicate whether
or not they would be willing to pay a specific value.
While the contingent valuation method is the subject of
a great deal of controversy,20 it also holds great promise
20

Much of the controversy centers on the various types of biases that may
result when individuals are asked to state true values for hypothetical
changes in resource quality. See Kahn (1998:102-109) for details on these
biases.
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for the study of nonmarket values. In 1990, as a result
of the Exxon Valdez oil spill, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Association (NOAA) drafted the Oil
Pollution Act, which specifically advocated the use of
the contingent valuation method for measuring nonuse
values associated with damages to natural resources.
Within the environmental and natural resource
valuation literature, conjoint analysis (CA) is the less
used stated preference technique to date. Essentially, it
differs from CVM in that conjoint analysis asks people to
make hypothetical choices across pair-wise bundles of
goods or by having people rank a number of alternatives
with a “price” being 1 alternative or characteristic in
the bundle. While this technique is just starting to gain
momentum in the environmental and natural resource
valuation literature (e.g., Louviere 1988, Adamowicz et
al. 1999), it has been widely used by researchers in
other disciplines (e.g., transportation, marketing, and
psychology) and for other problems.
The above discussion provided a brief description
of some of the most widely used environmental
resource valuation techniques and some examples of
how they have been used. Some of these methods are
accepted by federal and state agencies. For example,
the National Marine Fisheries Service has designated
random utility models as its chosen valuation technique.
CVM and TCM have been supported and used by the
U.S. Water Resources Council, and by state fish and
game agencies in such states as Oregon, Nevada, California, Idaho, and Maine (Loomis 1993). While these
methods are widely used, it is important to stress that
none of the approaches mentioned is without its flaws.
Indeed, there is continual debate on the validity and
tractability of each method discussed above.
Valuing a Deer – A Comparison Across
Applications
A valid question at this point is, how would these
different techniques compare in the values they assign a
particular resource? Indeed, given there are a multitude
of assumptions associated with each 1 of these methods
that may likely influence the actual outcome, and given
the often tentative links that are made between changes
in the environmental or wildlife resource and how
people respond or suggest they would respond, we
would not expect the values to be equal across methods. Yet, we would hope that the values would not
be an order of magnitude off without a good reason.
One resource that has been estimated using 3 different
techniques is the value of an additional deer. Estimates
of the value of an additional deer from outside the environmental and natural resource economics literature
have ranged from US$965 (Reed et al. 1982) to US$1,468
(Romin and Bissonette 1996b) in 1996 dollars. Reed et
al. (1982) based their estimates on a value determined
in a district court case in Golden, Colorado, whereas
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Roman and Bissonette (1996a) used estimates of total
hunting expenditures on licenses and permits in Utah.
Within the environmental and natural resource
literature, we can compare the results put forth by Keith
and Lyon (1985), Loomis et al. (1989a), and Schwabe
et al. (2000). As mentioned above, Keith and Lyon
(1985) use a household production function approach
to estimate the value to recreational hunters of a 1-unit
increase in mule deer herd size. They combine an estimate of the value of increasing hunter success with an
estimate of the responsiveness of hunter success to an
increase in deer herd resulting in an estimate for the
value of an additional deer of US$64.26 in 1996 dollars.
Loomis et al. (1989a) used a contingent valuation
survey to estimate the willingness to pay for an additional deer while considering both consumptive use
(i.e., the chance to bag an additional deer) and nonconsumptive use (i.e., the chance to view a deer). They surveyed California households and deer hunters to obtain
willingness to pay estimates for deer. Their results suggested that the consumptive value of an average buck
was approximately of US$165, and the nonconsumptive
value of an average deer was US$15.50. In 1996 dollars
these amount to US$208.78 and US$19.61, respectively.
Finally, Schwabe et al. (2000) used a random utility modeling method and estimated the value of a deer
at approximately US$182 in 1996 dollars. This value
estimate represents what Loomis et al. (1989a) termed
the consumptive value. These results are surprisingly
similar across studies in that they are less than an order
of magnitude different.
Costs
Of course, there are a variety of costs associated
with wildlife resources. There are direct costs the wildlife resources impose on humans, opportunity costs
associated with their habitat, external costs they impose
on other wildlife resources that humans value, and
finally the costs associated with maintaining a particular resource level or population. To perform a proper
BCA, all of these costs should be acknowledged and balanced against the benefits of maintaining the resource
over time. The example of maintaining a particular deer
population provides a more illustrative description of
each of these costs.
The direct costs deer impose on humans have
been widely discussed and enumerated. One of the
direct costs of maintaining a particular deer population
is the impact of deer-vehicle collisions on human life,
morbidity, and property damage. These costs are typically estimated by using medical and/or insurance costs,
or value of life statistics. For instance, Reed et al. (1982)
surveyed vehicle repair costs from Colorado State Patrol
accident reports and benchmarked those costs against
accident values as reported in insurance claims. Hansen

(1983) surveyed drivers that had submitted accident
reports to the Michigan State Police and obtained values
associated with property damage, injury and/or death.
Conover et al. (1995) surveyed the literature to come up
with an average vehicle repair bill. With the exception
of Hansen (1983), though, costs associated with human
injury and fatalities were neglected.
Crop damage is another major direct cost
imposed on humans by deer. Typically, the costs of
agricultural damages from deer can be estimated as the
market value of the lost commodity, and/or the cost
of implementing preventative measures. For example,
McNew and Curtis (1997) reported the extent of deer
damage to select grain crops in Maryland by multiplying
farmer-reported acreage losses by grain prices at harvest
time. Furthermore, these authors used regression analysis of farmer-reported estimates of damages and on-site
deer populations to calculate a deer population elasticity of crop damage. This elasticity measure allows for
the estimation of the additional damages that would
likely be incurred from a given increase in the deer
population.21 In addition to crop damage and vehicle
accidents, wildlife also impose direct costs through the
transmission of diseases (e.g., lyme disease), wildlife
attacks, and damages to households and the timber
industry (Conover et al. 1995).
In addition to direct costs, opportunity costs associated with wildlife habitat (the foregone value that
their habitat could garner) should be considered. That
is, any wildlife resource requires a habitat that could, in
most cases, be put to use in other activities. Wenders
(1995) asserted that landowners, whether public or private, often receive little compensation or generate little
revenue by providing or maintaining an adequate habitat for elk. As such, he suggested that competing interests for the use of the land, particularly by timber
or grazing interests, lead to a less-than-optimal supply
of habitat for elk from a social perspective. Similarly,
Brower and Slangen (1998) discussed how the variety
rich vegetation alongside banks and ditches alongside
peat meadowland provide excellent habitat for many
plant and bird species. Yet, much of this habitat is losing
ground to agricultural interests. Indeed, in this instance
the opportunity cost of maintaining the habitat is the
foregone income that could be generated by cropping
it.
Another type of cost is the cost wildlife resources
impose on other wildlife resources. While these costs
are somewhat more complicated to calculate since they
often require “costing” other nonmarket goods, they
can have real impacts on valued resources. For instance,
in maintaining a certain density of deer per square
mile, potential indirect costs the deer impose on other
21

For example, they estimate that a 10 % increase in the Maryland deer population would likely cause US$1.15 million in additional losses in revenues from
corn, soybeans and wheat.
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wildlife resources include loss of habitat for herb and
seedling species, or loss of the songbird species habitat
(Guynn 1999). Coyotes, by preying on sheep, may
impose additional costs on humans via less wool. Unless
these “other resources” have particular market-based
values, imputing a cost from their potential decline
would require some type of valuation study described
above.
A final type of cost is the cost of interventions
to maintain wildlife populations. As mentioned previously, the USDA Animal Damage Control Program spent
over US$26 million in 1988 alone on efforts to control
damages from wildlife, while the administrative costs
reached US$11 million. In addition to administrative
costs, there are often costs associated with installing
and maintaining structures intended to either maintain
existing wildlife populations or reduce the damage
wildlife population impose on society. For example,
efforts to reduce deer-vehicle collisions have included
the use of a variety of technologies, including deer whistles on cars, deer signs, fences, underpasses and overpasses, and reflectors (Romin and Bissonette 1996b).
With the exception of administrative costs, estimating
the costs of installation and maintenance is relatively
straightforward. For operating and maintenance costs,
the market price on materials and labor provides a good
estimate of their annual costs. For installation costs,
again, the market prices on materials and labor (discounted over the life expectancy of the project) provide
a suitable annual cost estimate.
Thus, in estimating the costs of maintaining wildlife resources or populations, market prices often provide a good starting point. Indeed, in calculating the
costs associated with human and property damage, the
land foregone for habitat, and mitigating or maintenance
factors market prices provide a suitable approach. Yet,
for the external costs on the environment and other
wildlife resources, as well as for the enumeration of the
associated administrative costs, other means will likely
be necessary.
POLICY IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES
Once the estimated optimal population size is
found, the question of how to achieve that level arises.
Or, if the current level and optimal level are the same,
how can such a population size be maintained? Two
general approaches to regulating wildlife that may be
used to achieve population objectives include openaccess regulations and limited-entry regulations (Kahn
1998). Open-access regulations are those regulations
that modify user behavior yet not user participation
directly. Limited-entry techniques try to encourage the
desired behavioral outcome through the use of economic incentives.
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Open-Access Regulations
Open-access regulations, similar to what are generally termed “command and control” style strategies,
call for the direct regulation of the users of the wildlife
resource through rules or standards. As such, they mandate restrictions as to how, when, or where users can
utilize the resource. For example, open-access regulations in hunting would include restrictions on the type
of guns allowed, allowable hunting days per week or
weeks within the year, or limits on the number of
bucks or does a hunter can bag. These regulations are
designed to maintain the wildlife resource population
at a desired level, but because they do not directly
target who participates, they do not necessarily serve
to ration or allocate the resource toward the users who
value it the highest. The restrictions imposed by openaccess regulations increase the costs to the users of
the resource. Hence, indirectly, open-access regulations
can lead to relatively less participation by less efficient
users of the resource if the added costs to the individual
hunter of complying with the regulations exceed the
value generated to the individual from hunting. For
example, restricting allowable hunting days to Mondays
through Saturdays imposes added time constraints on
users relative to allowing hunters the option of hunting
Monday through Sundays. Similarly, limiting the allowable weapons to shotguns rather than rifles limits the
range at which hunters can bag deer, and again imposes
an additional cost.
Interestingly, while restrictions on use can
impose additional costs directly on the users of the
resource, the intent of these restrictions is often to
limit the costs that individual users indirectly impose on
other users and nonusers. For instance, as Lueck (1995)
pointed out, some hunters can impose harmful effects
on others by using certain weapons that increase the
probability of an injury to a nonuser (dynamite, highpowered rifles, etc), or by hunting in areas of high
incidence of non-hunting human presence (roadsides,
urban areas, etc.). As such, open-access regulations can
directly address these potential problems.
Yet, it should be noted that while open-access
regulations can indeed minimize the impact of user
behavior on others, users are still likely to impose costs
on each other given that access to the resource is still
open to all who are willing to overcome the additional
constraints. Since the regulation does not directly ration
participation rates, the resource is open to uncontrolled
access whereby decisions by individual users of the
resource rarely consider the impact of their actions on
other users.
Limited-Entry Regulations
Alternatively, limited entry regulations, similar to
incentive-based instruments, are a flexible approach
that also target optimal population levels but do so by
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encouraging private interests to coincide with social
interests. This works in 1 of 2 ways. The regulation may
include either a tax or a fee to limit participation (e.g., a
fee for the right to fish or hunt in a given area). Or, this
regulation can require a system of permits or licenses
that give the owner the right to use the resource. Preferably, the permits are salable or transferable and thus can
be reallocated to the users that value the resource the
most.
Evaluating Open-Access and Limited-Entry
Regulations
In deciding upon the economic merits of a
particular strategy within these 2 general alternative
approaches, 3 criteria emerge. First, does the strategy
allocate the resources to the users who value it the
most? Second, are the users utilizing the resource in
the most cost-effective manner? And third, are the full
costs of using the resource borne by those users who
are realizing the benefits from its use?
The incentive-based systems of transferable permits and fees do tend to allocate the resource to those
who value it more, as those who are not willing to pay
the fee or buy the permit will not have access. Even if
the fee is initially set too low, it still has the effect of
excluding users whose value of using the resource is
lower than the fee. In the case of transferable or marketable permits, we are likely to observe a flow of permits
towards users who value the resource more (buyers of
permits) and away from users who value the resource
less (sellers of permits). Another advantage of tax or
permit systems is that they minimize the costs to users
in engaging in the activity. That is, users have the flexibility to choose the least costly manner in which to
use the resource. Yet, and this is necessarily a problem
with this sort of regulation, users may still impose external costs on others depending on the methods they
choose to utilize the resource. So, while the regulations
minimize the costs to the users, they may impose undue
external costs on other users or on society in general.
In principle, then, both types of policies could
achieve the desired objective of reducing damage to
the stock and therefore promote growth. However, the
limited-entry strategy is likely to meet the objective at
lower cost since open-access strategies treat all users
of the resource the same, regardless of how much it
costs them individually to comply with the standard.22
We therefore see that the limited-entry regulations meet
the requirements of the first 2 criteria – allocating the
resource to the highest valued users and minimizing the
costs of using the resource to the user, whereas open22

For economic efficiency, that is, to achieve the desired result at lowest possible cost, and given that users are likely to differ with respect to ability and
effort, the cost-effective strategy allows the user the freedom to choose the
most efficient means of using the resource.

access regulations do not. However, with its ability to
target specific harmful actions, open-access strategies
may be more effective at reducing some of the potential
external costs that users may impose on others. It would
seem, then, that the optimal strategy would include
components of both types of regulation. The limitedentry component serves to limit the users to those that
value the resource the most while the open-access regulations would minimize some of the negative effects
that users impose on others. Indeed, this combination
strategy is what we often observe in practice.
Finally, our discussion has not fully addressed
the issue of public versus private land ownership. This
distinction is extremely important for the optimal management of wildlife resources, including both optimal
population size and efficient regulatory strategy. For
a complete discussion of the public/private land use
dimensions and their impact on policy, see Loomis
(1993) and Lueck (1995).
CONCLUSION
There is little uncertainty that wildlife-human
conflicts impose significant costs on society. Yet, as
most wildlife managers, hunters, and nature enthusiasts
would agree, there is also enormous value associated
with these same wildlife resources. In this review, we
have attempted to provide a framework to help decision-makers manage these wildlife resources more efficiently. In essence, we have illustrated the potential
use of benefit-cost analysis to improve the efficiency of
wildlife resource management. Optimal wildlife populations can be estimated through a careful balancing of
the benefits and costs of wildlife to society, both now
and in the future.
In particular, we described a number of methods
for placing a value on certain types of wildlife
resources. These methods, including the revealed preference and stated preference techniques, can help to
quantify the value of these resources to society, particularly those values which might not be assessed when
using the traditional market-based pricing approach.
Indeed, the nonmarket values from many of the wildlife
resources may likely overshadow their market-based
values. Furthermore, we introduced a variety of cost
categories to describe the wide range of opportunity
costs associated with maintaining wildlife populations,
including (1) harmful wildlife-human interactions, (2)
impacts on other wildlife resources, (3) foregone production or value of their habitats in other uses, and (4)
the direct regulatory and mitigating costs of control.
We showed that a stand-alone market-based approach
to wildlife resource management will fail to balance
the full range of costs and benefits from maintaining
wildlife resources. Rather, these types of resources are
better managed, with optimality in mind, by using a
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combination of regulatory strategies that both maximize
the value of the resource to the actual users while
minimizing the private and social costs to other users
and nonusers.
Finally, in reviewing the literature, 2 strands seem
to have evolved. There is the literature associated with
valuing wildlife resources, and includes the work by
Hammack and Brown (1974), Loomis et al. (1989b),
Keith and Lyon (1985), and Mendelsohn (1984). There is
also the literature on the costs of wildlife management
and efforts to reduce harmful human-wildlife interactions, including the work by Conover et al. (1995),
Roman and Bissonette (1996a,b), and Reed et al.
(1982). In essence, there is increasingly more literature
and research on both the benefits associated with wildlife resources and the costs associated with wildlife
resources. What seems to be lacking, then, is a merging
of these 2 strands into useful and informative exercises
investigating optimal wildlife management strategies.
With due acknowledgement of the problems associated
with estimating both the values derived from wildlife
resources and the costs that are associated with
their maintenance, the principle elements required for
proper benefit-cost analyses do exist.
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